Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Text

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00266 01 OF 03 191715Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 HA-05 COME-00
ACDE-00 /100 W
----------045057 191718Z /43
R 181645Z MAY 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2850
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS BEL
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0266

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MAY 18 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

THERE FOLLOWS AN INFORMAL DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF THE
FULL TEXT OF GDR REP'S (OESER) MAY 18 PLENARY STATEMENT,
WHICH WAS DELIVERED IN GERMAN.

BEGIN GEXT:

MR CHAIRMAN

1. WITHIN THE ALL-EMBRACING EFFORTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES
DIRECTED AT STRENGTEHNING PEACE AND ESPECIALLY REDUCING THE DANGER
OF THE OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE INSURING AND DEEPENING OF THE
PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT PLACE. THIS WAS
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00266 01 OF 03 191715Z

DISTINVTLY EXPRESSED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE MEMBER STATES
OF THE WARSAW TREATY IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE CONFERENCE AT SOFIA
ON 25 APRIL 1978. THEY COME OUT AGAINST "THE FURTHER GROWTH OF
THE ARMS RACE AND THE AGGRAVATION OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION ON
THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT". ON BEHALF OF THEIR COUNTRIES THEY ARE
IN FAVOR OF "THE MOST RAPID ADOPTION OF CONCRETE AND EFFECTIVE
STEPS, AIMED AT DIMINISHING MILITARY CONFRONTATION, ASSISTING

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

DISARMAMENT AND THE STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE".

2. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT A LESSENING OF THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF MILITARY POWER IN THE HEART OF OUR CONTINENT WOULD, TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE, ASSIST IN INCREASING STABILITY, STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE - AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GENERAL GOALS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE, THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE UNSHAKABLY GUIDED BY THOSE TASKS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, ON WHICH WE AGREED IN JUNE 1973: THAT IS, TO REACH THE GOAL OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

3. FROM THE TIME OF THE BEGINNING OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS APPROXIMATELY FIVE YEARS AGO, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE BEEN STRIVING FOR AN ESSENTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ALL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVING ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE, ON A MUTUAL BASIS, THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE AT A LOWER LEVEL, WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES.

4. IF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD TAKEN AS THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PRESENTED BY THE USSR, CSSR, GDR, AND PPR, OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973, THEN UP TO THE PRESENT TIME THERE WOULD ALREADY BE REDUCED 170,000 MILITARY SERVICEMEN TOETHER WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT FROM BOTH THE SOCIALIST
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DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES AND FROM THE WESTERN ONES. IF ONE TAKES OFFICIAL NUMERICAL DATA AS A BASIS, THEN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES OF BOTH OF THE TWO MILITARY GROUPINGS WOULD, AT THE PRESENT TIME, CONSIST OF ONLY A LITTLE MORE THAN 800,000 MEN INSTEAD OF THE ALMOST 1,000,000.

5. THE RESULT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR PROPOSALS WOULD BE A REAL LESSENING OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTAGION, A SIGNIFICANT ADDITION TO POLITICAL DETENTE AS IS DEMANDED BY THE FINAL ACT SIGNED IN HELSINKI. THE INITIATIVES INTRODUCED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DURING THE LAST YEARS BEAR WITNESS TO THE REALISM AND WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY FIND IT NECESSARY TO NOTE THAT UP TILL NOW THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES ARE HARDLY DISPLAYING A SIGNIFICANT READINESS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THEREFORE, THE SOCIALIST STATES PROPOSE TO TAKE AN INITIAL STEP. THEY HAVE ALSO INTRODUCED A PROPOSAL NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BOTH OF THESE MEASURES COULD BECOME A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE FOR THE INITIAL STEPS ON THE ROAD TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MORE DISTANT GOALS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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6. THE PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 1976 IN WHICH THE SOCIALIST STATES AGREED WITH THE CARRYING OUT OF REDUCTIONS IN TWO STAGES, SO THAT IN THE FIRST STAGE ONLY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND USA WOULD BE REDUCED, WAS NOT THE LEAST IMPORTANT EXAMPLE OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. THIS SIGNIFIED AND SIGNIFIES A SIGNIFICANT PLEDGE OF CONFIDENCE THAT ALL ELEVEN DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD ASSUME IDENTICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THEREFORE, ACCORDING TO THIS MOST JUST APPROACH, THERE WOULD BE A PARALLEL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REDUCTIONS FROM THE FIRST STAGE.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00266 02 OF 03 191435Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0266

7. THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE SERIOUS APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST STATES THERE HAS THUS FAR BEEN NO ACCORD REACHED AT THE VIENNA TALKS, AND THAT A FIRST AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN REACHED, IS THE RESULT OF THE UNREALISTIC POSITION OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, OUR WESTERN PARTNERS IN THE TAKS HAVE BEEN STICKING TO A CONCEPT THAT WOULD GIVE THEM UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. THEIR "OUTLINE PROPOSAL" OF NOVEMBER 1973 AND ITS MODIFICATION OF NOVEMBER 1975 CONTAIN UNEQUAL OBLIGATIONS, WITHE HELP OF WHICH THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO CHANGE THE EXISTING MILITARY RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THEIR FAVOUR:

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

I. THE WESTERN DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES WISH TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES OVERALL ONLY BY ONE THIRD OF THE NUMBER WHICH THEY DEMAND BE REDUCED BY THE SOCIALIST STATES.

II. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE USA, THEY REFUSE AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE ANY CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00266 02 OF 03 191435Z

REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND OF AIR FORCES. HOWEVER, THEY DEMAND FROM THE SOVIET UNION A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN TANK FORCES AND LIMITATIONS ON THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH.

III. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES AND CANADA, WHICH DEPLOY APPROXIMATELY THREE QUARTERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO IN CENTRAL UEROPE, DO NOT SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE UPON THEMSELVES NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS FOR REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHILE THEY ARE DEMANDING THIS FROM THE USSR.

8. THE REALISATION OF THE DEMANDS OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES FOR REDUCTIONS ROUGHLY THREE TIMES GREATER FROM THE SOCIALIST STATES WOULD GIVE SUPERIORITY TO NATO OF MORE THAN 150,000 MEN IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THUS WOULD UNDERMINE THE EXISTING APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE.

9. IN THE COURSE OF THE LAST YEARS WE HAVE PROVEN IN DETAIL THAT THIS UNREALISTIC CONCEPTION HINDERS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. IT CONTRADICTS THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND UNDERSTANDINGS AGREED IN JUNE 1973:

- IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE OBLIGATIONS FORESEEN FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DEPRIVED OF ANY MUTUALITY OR EQUIVALENCE;

- IN THE SECOND PLACE, THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE SEVERELY DIMINISHED;

- IN THE THIRD PLACE, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

10. IN THE SPEECH OF AMBASSADOR BEHRENDS OF 19 APRIL OF THIS YEAR THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS EMPHASISED, THAT THEY CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00266 02 OF 03 191435Z

ALLEGEDLY ATTACH FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO THE AGREED GOALS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH CONSISTS IN THE FACT THAT "BY MEANS OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE STABILITY WOULD BE INCREASED AND PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE STRENGTHENED." UNFORTUNATELY, IN THE "CHANGES IN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ALREADY PUT FORWARD" INTRODUCED BY HIM, THERE CANNOT BE SEEN SO FAR ANY SERIOUS SHIFTS TOWARD THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY, OF NOT DIMINISHING SECURITY, AND OF NOT RECEIVING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS, WHICH HINDER THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AGREEMENT, IN THE WORDS OF AMBASSADOR BEHRENDS, "REMAIN UNCHANGED".

11. THIS UNCHANGED WESTERN BASIC POSITION IGNORES THE REAL SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH, AS LEADING STATESMAN OF THE SOCIALIST STATE PARTICIPANTS HAVE REPEATEDLY NOTED, IS CHARACTER-ISED BY APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE. THE MILITARY BALANCE EXTENDS BOTH TO PERSONNEL AND TO ARMAMENTS AS WELL AS TO THE RESULTANT COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF BOTH OF THE MAJOR MILITARY GROUPINGS CONCENTRATED IN THE HEART OF OUR CONTINENT. WESTERN STATEMEN HAVE ALSO, IN THEIR OWN STATEMENTS, REPEATEDLY RECOGNIZED THIS GIVEN REAL FACT. HOWEVER, IT IS NECESSRY TO SAY THAT THEIR STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN OF A CONJUNCTURAL NATURE. IT IS HOPED THAT THE WESTERN STATES PARTICIPANTS WILL, WITH TIME, AGREE WITH A REALISTIC POSITION AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THEY HAVE, IN PARTICULAR, SINCE THE EXCHANGE IN 1976 OF OFFICIAL NUMERICAL DATA ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DETAILED DISCUSSION, HAD THE POSSIBILITY OF CORRECTING THEIR UNREALISTIC POINTS OF DEPARTURE. THE AVAILABLE DATA WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY GOVERNMENTS HAS FINALLY CONFIRMED THE EXISTENCE OF A MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION OF REDUCTIONS. AFTER THE SOCIALIST STATES, WITH THEIR OWN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL OF 25 OCTOBER 1977, TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL NUMERICAL DATA, IT IS HIGH TIME FOR THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO SIGNS

OF THIS WHATSOEVER AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, IF THEY SERIOUSLY WISH TO FACILITATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PRGRESS IN THE NGOTIATIONS, MUST AT LEAST SOBERLY PROCEED FROM THE REAL MILITARY BALANCE.

12. IF ONE TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE REAL SITUATION, THEN IT BECOMES CLEAR JUST HOW INSUBSTANTIAL THE THESIS OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IS THAT, ALLEGEDLY, IT IS STILL NECESSARY FROM THE OUTSET TO

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00266 03 OF 03 191438Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0266

ESTABLISH APPROXIMATE PARITY. THEIR PROPOSALS CONCERNING ASYM-
METRIC REDUCTIONS SHOW THAT IN THIS WAY THEY WISH TO JUSTIFY AN
OUTCOME WHICH WOULD PRESENT THEM WITH MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND
SUPERIORITY IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA. THIS HOWEVER IS A HOPELESS
DEMAND WHICH IS PROTRACTING THE COURSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

13. THERE IS NO OTHER POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION TO THE DEMAND FOR
COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WHICH THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS REPEATEDLY
MAKE. THIS DEMAND ALSO EVADES THE CONCRETE QUESTION OF THE MUTUAL
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BY ALL STATES PARTICIPANTS.
THUS, HERE THE BASIC IDEA IS NOT THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD
MAKE THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION TO COLLECTIVELY TAKING
PART IN THE REDUCTION. ON THE CONTRARY* THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS
WISH, WITH THIS THESIS TO EVADE PROVISIONS WHICH

A. COMMIT ALL STATES DIRECT-PARTICIPANTS TO MAKING CONCRETE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REDUCTION, AND

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00266 03 OF 03 191438Z

B. ENVISAGE PROPORTIONATELY EQUAL REDUCTIONS FOR ALL.
14. FURTHERMORE, THE WESTERN "INITIATIVE" OF 19 PARIL
1978 LEAVES WITHOUT RESPONSE, A SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE
AN ESSENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR ITS EVALUATION INCLUDING THE CONTENTS
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SECOND PHASE.

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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15. ON TWO POINTS THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE, TO A CERTAIN DEGREE, TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, WE OBSERVE THAT IN DOING SO THEY HAVE RECOGNIZED, AFTER A LONG TIME, JUST HOW JUSTIFIED IS THE DEMAND OF THE SOCIALIST STATES FOR A CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION. THIS CONCERNS, IN PARTICULAR, THE "SPECIFIC GUARANTEES" ON THE "PARTICIPATION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT-PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA IN A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTION".

16. HOWEVER, SINCE THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS IN THE WESTERN POSITION ARE IN THEIR CONTENT AND FORM FULLY DEPENDENT ON THE UNCHANGED BASIC SCHEME OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS, THEIR SIGNIFICANCE INEVITABLY REMAINS LIMITED. IF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WANT TO BRING ABOUT A TURNING POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEN SUCH MODIFI-CATIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT.

17 IT IS NECESSARY:

FIRSTLY, THAT THEY SHOULD REFRAIN FROM THEIR UNREALISTIC ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE EXISTING PARITY THROUGH ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS AND,

SECONDLY, THAT ALL WESTERN STATES PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO REDUCE THEIR OWN PARTICULAR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE PROPORTIONALLY TO THEIR VOLUME AND THUS, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREED TASK OF THE NEGOOIATIONS, REALISE THE MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

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18. THE REMARKS WHICH WE HAVE MADE TODAY DO NOT, IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, EXCLUSDE THAT WE WILL THOROUGHLY STUDY AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ANY MODIFICATION IN THE WESTERN POSITION AND ANY CHANGE OF DETAIL WHICH IS CONTAINED IN THE PRESENT NATO INITIATIVE.
WE ALSO DID THIS AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 1975. THE SUBSEQUENT PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF FEBRUARY 1976 WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT IN A CONCRETE WAY ALL THE CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS AN EXPRESSION OF OUR CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH.

19. THE BASIC POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AND THEIR ASPIRATION TO REACH EFFECTIVE MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IS JUST. THEREFORE THEIR PROPOSALS, AS BEFORE, DEMONSTRATE THE DIRECTION TOWARDS AND ARE AN APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT. THE LIMITED CHANGES IN THE WESTERN POSITION ALSO REFLECT THE JUST CHARACTER OF OUR DEMAND FOR EQUIVALENT REDUCTIONS CARRIED OUT BY ALL
PARTICIAPNTS.

20. THE WESTERN BASIC POSITION CONTINUES TO DELAY THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME CERTAIN NATO STATES ARE, IN

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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

A DEMONSTRATIVE FORM, INCREASING THE VOLUME OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA. INFLUENTIAL CIRCLES CONTINUE WITH THEIR PLANS TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY NEUTRON WEAPONS IN WESTERN EUROPE.

21. THESE EFFECTS OF THE ARMS RACE EXACERBATE THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ARE IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION WITH THE AIMS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE REFUSAL BY THE WESTERN STATES PARTICIPANTS TO TAKE UPON THEMSELVES OBLIGATIONS NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES FOR THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH A POSITION IS NOT APPROPRIATE IN STRENGTHENING THE NECESSARY BASIS OF TRUST AND FACILITATING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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22. THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE CONCERNED TO REACH A FUNDAMENTAL TURNING POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ARE READY, ON A MUTUAL BASIS, ALSO EFFECTVELY TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THEIR PROPOSALS WHICH ENVISAGE COMPREHENSIVE REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARE PROOF OF THIS. THEREFORE THEY ARE JUSTIFIED IN DEMANDING THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THE SAME WILLINGNESS AND IN PRACTICE FACILITATE A MUTUAL REDUCTION. THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE READY TO DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO FIND SOLUTIONS WHICH ARE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SIDES AND ALSO TO REDUCE THE MILITARY TENSION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHERE IT IS PARTICULARLY GREAT AND DANGEROUS.

23. AS BEFORE IT IS FOR THE WESTERN STATES PARTICIPANTS TO ASSIST IN THIS BY MAKING A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION BOTH AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND OUTSIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS.
END TEXT.RESOR

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EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
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